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PeopleTraffic is a proposed initiative to develop a real-time, open-data population density map-
ping tool open to public institutions, private companies and the civil society, providing a common
framework for infection spreading prevention. The system is based on a real-time people’ locations
gathering and mapping system from available 2G, 3G and 4G mobile networks operators, enforcing
privacy-by-design through the adoption of an innovative data anonymizing algorithm inspired by
quantum information de-localizing processes. Besides being originally targeted to help balancing
social distancing regulations during the Phase-2 of the COVID-19 pandemics, PeopleTraffic would
be beneficial for any infection spreading prevention event, e.g. supporting policy-makers in strategic
decision-making.
INTRODUCTION
The adoption of social distancing regulations, en-
forcing physical separation between individuals to limit
population density and reducing individual-to-individual
contacts, has been so far the most effective tool employed
by national countries to mitigate the COVID-19 pan-
demics cases’ shock on their national sanitary systems
[1]. The effectiveness of these regulations was predicted
by most epidemic models [2] based on the hypothesis that
individual-to-individual contact is the main transmission
process driving infection spreading (see [3] for a review).
Their strong corroboration by the observations lead to
conclude that local population density in the proximity
of an individual has a strong a-priori predictive power on
the likeliness of that individual to get infected.
Civil society’s response to these strict social distanc-
ing regulations and restrictions has been widely positive
(i.e. with a high degree of acceptance) in most countries
involved in the first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic
(e.g. ∼ 85% for the Italian case, see [4]). This indicates
that most people act according to regulations for their
own and common interests, and also suggests that wide
adoption of positive individual behaviours is likely if all
citizens are given a set of good practices and tools to
follow them.
It became also clear, on the other hand, that strict
social distancing regulations have profound impacts on
countries’ economies [5], and their partial to full relax-
ation becomes necessary to mitigate the adverse econom-
ical effects as soon as pressure on the sanitary systems
is sufficiently relaxed. This marks the beginning of the
co-existence period with the infection (the so-called pan-
demic Phase-2), which is expected to last approximately
until a vaccination becomes available to the mass public
(estimated mid-2021 for the COVID-19 case).
The main risk connected to relaxing social distancing
measures is to increase the risk of epidemic resumption
due to increased people individual-to-individual contacts.
The possibility to differentiate, rather than relieve, social
distancing policies in different contexts is likely to mit-
igate that risk and consequent novel shocks on national
sanitary systems. In what forms this differentiation can
take place, it is one of the most discussed themes at the
moment by policy-makers of most countries involved in
the epidemic, as the ability to efficiently tune social dis-
tancing rules in economic, social and personal life con-
texts (and rationally distribute the diffusion risk) could
have a profound impact on each country economic per-
formance during Phase-2.
Here we propose an initiative to develop a real-time,
open-data population density and flux mapping system,
hypothetically named PeopleTraffic, in an analogy to the
well-known Google Traffic system for road traffic. The
proposed system enforces privacy-by-design and allows
privacy levels to be externally and transparently regu-
lated through the use of an innovative anonymizing al-
gorithm specifically designed for mapping applications
and inspired by quantum information de-localizing pro-
cesses. This tool relies on GSM, not bluetooth sensing.
Contrary to many other systems being developed that
are based on direct proximity sensing via Bluetooth, and
subsequent notifications in case of proximity with a sub-
sequently identified infected individual, this scheme re-
lies on determining the average local area person den-
sity via GSM/UMTS/LTE. It is meant to enable a win-
win reduction of pandemic diffusion risks linked to peo-
ple movements by supporting their autonomous risk pre-
vention evaluations and decisions with the knowledge of
real-time population density and fluxes. Furthermore, it
would allow social distancing to be adapted to a variety
of contexts, providing valuable quasi real-time informa-
tion to individuals and policy-makers in taking decisions
(both at the individual and strategic levels) based on
a clear view of people density, which has proved so far
one of the most reliable a-priori predictors of infection
spreading. Finally, in the long-term, it could be a driver
of innovation and economic activity, for instance as a tool
for accurate flux and market analyses and business cases
identification.
In order for the population density and flux knowl-
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2edge to be effective for individual-to-individual contact
prevention, spatial and time resolutions close to the in-
dividual proximity (i.e. tens of meters and minutes) are
necessary. This is key to allow virtuous behaviour orient-
ing at the individual scale, like choosing the right means
of transportation for commuting, or the right places and
timing for necessary and leisure activities. This requires
however the system to deal with individual privacy by
design, preventing especially the risk of individual re-
identification and tracing.
Bringing the knowledge of real-time population density
and flux to everyone thus necessitates solving two main
challenges: how to technically produce maps of sufficient
resolution to be useful for individual-to-individual con-
tact prevention, and a strong privacy risks mitigation ap-
proach enforcing full transparency and privacy-by-design
to the data handling and sharing system.
In this work, we review the possibilities offered by
present-day technologies in constructing real-time pop-
ulation density and flux maps through the use of exist-
ing Real-Time Locating System (RTLS) with sufficient
spatial and temporal resolutions to get close the indi-
vidual scale. Secondly, we approach the privacy concern
in quantitative manner, i.e. describing a tunable algo-
rithm providing privacy-by-design by preventing individ-
uals’ localization at the level of the each data provider.
Different levels of privacy could be transparently set (at
the price of statistics necessary to reach a certain level of
resolution) for effective policing to be allowed. Last, we
lay out the design of the information processing system,
highlighting its principal implementation characteristics.
MEASURING PEOPLE LOCATIONS IN REAL
TIME
The main positional data acquisition methods we con-
sidered here are these that can be obtained from real-time
data analysis of nowadays capillary mobile networks (i.e.
these adopting GSM, UMTS, and LTE network technolo-
gies), i.e. not requiring any software to be installed on
individual user equipment (UE).
Modern mobile networks, from the physical layer point
of view, allow many of such techniques with varying accu-
racies and required computing power [6]. What method
can be implemented on each territory is thus mainly
in the hands of each mobile network provider capabili-
ties and data sharing policies. It’s reasonable to assume
that different accuracies would be obtained from differ-
ent providers each adopting its own localization approach
from the simplest to the most elaborated method demon-
strated so far.
Here we consider the two limiting cases: A) the mere
counting of number of connections per mobile network
cell (also known as localization through cell identity, CI)
and B) accurate individual UE positioning by the net-
work via the highest accuracy available methods, e.g.
RSSI triangulation or observed time difference of arrival
(OTDOA).
Scenario A, i.e. counting the number of connections
per network cell, has the advantage to be applicable
to most network technologies, including public WiFi
hotspots. It is the simplest and most anonymous ap-
proach, based on data that most network providers al-
ready possess (and even sell for market analytics purposes
in some cases [7]). Its mapping accuracy is however lim-
ited by the size of deployed network cells.
Scenario B, i.e. measuring independently each UE
position, can provide sub-cell resolution at the price of
higher requirements in terms of complexity, data process-
ing power and personal data handling. Most network
providers already developed all necessary infrastructures
during the LTE technology deployment phases to meet
regulatory emergency call positioning requirements. In-
deed, the importance of accurately geo-locating emer-
gency phone calls was recognized to be so socially im-
pacting already that it was made part of the LTE net-
work standard: as of 2020, 70 % of emergency calls in the
United States are positionally located within 50 m [8].
Individual UE locating methods usually require a data
anonymizing step after mapping is performed to comply
to General Data Protection Regulations (see Privacy sec-
tion). Mapping and anonymizing algorithms have typi-
cally to be run by the network operators to avoid dis-
tributing non-anonymous data. As for the former case,
achievable resolutions increase proportionally to mutual
inter-distances between transceiver stations.
Distribution of mobile network cells
Expected positional accuracies of both scenario A and
B are proportional to local densities of mobile network
cells. Thus, mapping them on country scales is necessary
to evaluate the realizability of a mass RTLS as the one
here discussed in a realistic use-case scenario.
We conducted a survey of existing cell locations and
sizes to determine the granularities of GSM, UMTS and
LTE networks and estimate the positional accuracies that
could be obtained by network operators adopting the two
approaches discussed above.
The study was conducted by merging all available cells
identification codes and geo-locations from the OpenCel-
lID [9] and Mozilla Location Services [10] free databases.
Each cell is uniquely identified by its Mobile Country
Code (MCC), Mobile Network Code (MNC), Location
Area Code (LAC) and Cell Identification number (CID).
It’s worth summarizing, for the following discussions,
how these databases are constructed. They are built
upon big datasets of geo-tagged mobile connections to in-
dividual cells of the networks from physical people mobile
phones participating in the mapping initiatives, logging
3and streaming their anonymous GPS positions and con-
nected network cells identification numbers while mov-
ing. Each set of mobile phones’ logged GPS positions is
then clustered on a per-cell basis, from which the cen-
troid position is calculated by averaging all samples’ po-
sitions. Cell connection ranges are also estimated by the
spatial spread of each cluster points. The number of sam-
ples available per cell is widely distributed due to this
statistical acquisition modality, spanning from the < 10
samples of infrequently visited cells up to the > 10000
samples of most frequently visited cells (Fig. 1, top row).
Ranges are similarly widely distributed, spanning from
a few m to 100 km (Fig. 1, bottom row). We applied a
data quality cut to the dataset rejecting all these cells
with < 8 samples, giving rise to an nonphysical tail in
the ranges distribution < 50 m (Fig. 1, dashed lines). It
is worth noting also that, despite the notable dimensions
of these location databases, their statistical acquisition
modality can give rise to systematic errors when com-
paring different contexts. A first issue is spatial non-
uniformity in sampling/partial territorial coverage. This
issue was mitigated analyzing territories with comparable
amounts of acquired samples per unit surface (given in
the databases). A second concern is the completeness of
the databases for small or local mobile network providers
in terms of actual active cells on the territory. For this
reason, the analyses reported here are given separately
per network provider and limiting to those with major
shares of physical-people Sim cards in Italy: TIM, Voda-
fone and Wind Tre, covering 30.0 %, 27.2 % and 24.7 %
market respectively [11].
By this method, about 1.25 · 106 unique mobile cells
were listed on the Italian territory (see Fig. 2, show-
ing with different color the density distribution of GSM,
UMTS an LTE cells). The list of cells was subsequently
reduced to the scale of single urban territories. Here we
considered the two historical city centers of the cities of
Rome, a very large-sized town (Fig. 2, right bottom),
and of Genoa, a large-sized town (Fig. 2, right top). The
former, being the reference case-study city used in [12],
allows also direct spatial resolution comparisons between
the methods, while the latter is an example of large-sized
town with complex orography (seaside, rivers and hills)
as typically found in Italian provinces.
In order to compare GSM, UMTS and LTE network
cell sizes, one has first to determine their expected spa-
tial shapes (here referred to as connection domains) to be
able to then reconstruct their size distributions. Connec-
tion domains are here defined as those surface domains
in whose boundaries single mobile devices can connect
with a certain probability to that particular network cell.
Constructing connection domains associated to each cell
thus implies accounting for the typical behaviour of mo-
bile network devices to connect to their closest cell, when
any is available, starting from the cell positions ~pi and
ranges ri and evaluating any point in the surface. Solving
this problem in the general case is a genuine challenge,
suggesting the use of a Monte-Carlo approach. Here we
adopted an approximated approach valid in the high net-
work cell density limit. In this regime, cell inter-distances
are much smaller than the maximum connection ranges
allowed by the technology and observed ranges are set
almost entirely by the transceiver positions ~pi (thus ne-
glecting ri). Also, it implies that the surface is completely
covered by connection domains, forming a tessellation set
by ~pi. This type of arbitrary tessellations constructed
upon a set of generating points ~pi are usually known as
Voronoi tessellations [13].
Voronoi tessellations are constructed from a set of gen-
erating positions ~pi as follows: the domain relative to
the i-th point is defined by all points ~xj of the surface
for which ~pi is the closest generating point, according
to the distance function d(~xj , ~pi), here set to the two-
dimensional Euclidean distance d(~xj , ~pi) := ||~xj − ~pi||.
At first glance, it may look like the use of Voronoi tes-
sellations with the Euclidean distance for constructing
connection domains is only grossly approximating the
real process of mobile devices connecting to their most
intense nearby transceiver. One might argue that this
process implicitly assumes equal transmission power and
reception sensitivity for all cell transceivers and uniform
antenna angular emission patterns, and that nearby cells
overlap each other to allow handovers.
The first criticism would be correct if exact cell towers
positions would be used for constructing the connection
domains. Here, however, cell positions ~xi taken from lo-
cation databases are calculated as cluster centroids from
the original geo-tagged user positions. Voronoi tessella-
tions with the Euclidean distance are nothing but the
graphical representations of the spatial domains asso-
ciated to the clusters calculated by the well-known K-
means clustering algorithm. Indeed, K-means clusters
are obtained minimizing the sum-of-squares of all Eu-
clidean distances between N generating points (the clus-
ter centroids) and the dataset samples, which is the same
process to build a Voronoi tessellation with the Euclidean
distance.
The second criticism is correct in that it possible for
a device to connect to a cell even on the outside of its
connection domain. However, this is unlikely to happen
frequently, as normally, when a mobile device leaves a cell
connection domain, automatic handover occurs transfer-
ring the connection to the nearby cell with its better sig-
nal reception. For this to occur nonetheless, either the
device has to move at high velocity or channel satura-
tion has to occur, i.e. nearby cells handover connections
having all connection channels used.
The distributions of connection domains for the TIM
(MNC-1), Vodafone (MNC-10) and Wind Tre (MNC-88)
network operators were constructed using the subset of
cells’ position associated to each MNC code. Their spa-
tial distribution for the whole Italian territory are omit-
4Figure 1: Overview of the Mozilla Location Service database: raw (blue) and data quality cut (brown) distributions
of single cells’ number of geo-tagged samples (top row) and measured ranges (bottom row) for GSM (left), UMTS
(center) and LTE (right) technologies on the Italian territory.
Figure 2: Spatial distribution of mobile network cell positions from all network operators on the whole Italian
territory (left) and in typical Italian urban contexts: Rome (right bottom) and Genoa (right top) historical city
centers.
ted due to their complexity, while they are shown for
the Rome and Genova historical city centers in Fig. 3
and Fig. 4 respectively. The statistical analysis of their
surfaces are shown in Fig. 5 for the whole Italian terri-
tory and in Fig. 6, Fig. 7 for the historical city centers
of Rome and Genoa respectively. Associated network
cell radii rGSM, rUMTS and rLTE (also reported in the
figures) were calculated under the approximation of av-
5Figure 3: Connection domains spatial chart (see text) for the TIM (top row), Vodafone (middle row) and Wind Tre
(bottom row) network operators and for the GSM (left column), UMTS (middle column) and LTE (right column)
technologies in a very large-sized town (here the historical center of the city of Rome).
erage circular cell (i.e. inverting S = pir2), valid in the
high number of cells limit.
The distributions on the whole Italian territory show
that deployed GSM, UMTS and LTE networks have in-
creasingly higher spatial granularities as expected, with
average cell radii of ≈ 2.0 km, ≈ 1.6 km and ≈ 1.4 km
respectively and 10% fluctuations from network opera-
tor to network operator. Average cell radii dramatically
reduce while zooming on a single urban context. In the
case of Rome, a very large-sized town, these reduce to
≈ 0.7 km, ≈ 0.4 km and ≈ 0.3 km whereas in the case
of Genoa, a large-sized town, they similarly reduce to
≈ 0.3 km, ≈ 0.5 km and ≈ 0.4 km.
LTE networks positional accuracies
An accurate estimate of positional accuracy of de-
ployed LTE networks can now be obtained by combining
the measured cell radii with an evaluation of the intrin-
sic resolution of CI and OTDOA localization techniques
in a controlled test scenario including noise and three-
dimensional effects. Here we considered the horizontal
accuracy analyses reported in Ryde´n et al. [14], which
established that spatial resolutions of σALTE = 268 m and
σBLTE = 27 m (Gaussian standard deviations at 68% er-
ror) can be obtained for scenario A and B respectively
with regularly-spaced outdoor cells of 167 m radius (i.e.
1/3 of the interdistance between transceivers considered
in the study). The analysis of [14], in other words, re-
ports that indirect UE position detection by cell identity
6Figure 4: Connection domains spatial chart (see text) for the TIM (top row), Vodafone (middle row) and Wind Tre
(bottom row) network operators and for the GSM (left column), UMTS (middle column) and LTE (right column)
technologies in a large-sized town (here the historical center of the city of Genoa).
has a resolution (at 68% error level) σALTE ≈ 1.6 · rLTE.
These resolutions were scaled by the ratio of the cells
radii to get the estimated ground resolutions of deployed
networks. A summary of the obtained positioning resolu-
tions for the different contexts is given in Tab. I. By using
anonymous CI data only and combining data of different
LTE network providers, resolutions up to ∼ 250 m can be
obtained in dense urban areas. Using OTDOA, a factor
of 10 in resolution is gained, bringing it down to ∼ 25 m.
GSM networks positional accuracies
The first experiments of population density measure-
ments in urban contexts were conducted about 15 years
ago in Rome by the Senseable Cities group of the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (see [15]) using Tele-
com Italia Mobile (TIM) GSM towers and its Localizing
and Handling Network Event System (LocHNESs) plat-
form to measure in real-time people density and fluxes
through the localization and mapping of each individ-
ual UE. Indeed, the location method implemented in the
platform combined measured signal strengths from serv-
ing transceiver stations, their neighboring ones and from
each mobile device to triangulate their locations every
∼ 0.5 s, in a similar way to what OTDOA does in the
case of LTE networks. A spatial resolution of 163 m
was obtained in Rome’s urban area with the available
GSM network, increasing to 295 m in the suburbs and
to 1235 m in the extra-urban area [12]. More recent ex-
periments adopting time difference of arrival localization
algorithms have also shown to be able to break the 50 m
7Figure 5: Distribution of GSM (red), UMTS (green) and LTE (blue) cell surfaces (cut at 100 km2) for the three
principal network operators on the whole Italian territory.
Figure 6: Distribution of GSM (red), UMTS (green) and LTE (blue) cell surfaces (cut at 100 km2) for the three
principal network operators in a very large-sized town (here the historical center of the city of Rome).
barrier in an urban context using GSM only [16]. Scaling
the LocHNESs method resolution obtained in Rome by
the GSM cells sizes in the different territories by these
of Rome (see Fig. 6) allows to calculate the estimated
resolution σBGSM of GSM in a realistic scenario B.
The estimate of GSM resolution in a realistic scenario
A (cell identity only) was obtained with the same method
used for LTE, i.e. by considering the estimates in [14] to
define σAGSM ≈ 1.6 · rGSM.
A summary of the obtained positioning resolutions for
the different contexts is given in Tab. II. Results in sce-
nario B are comparable between GSM and LTE after be-
ing scaled by their different cell sizes, further suggesting
that resolution is mostly set by geometrical disposition of
the cells on the territory rather than technology-specific
location protocols implementations.
8Figure 7: Distribution of GSM (red), UMTS (green) and LTE (blue) cell surfaces (cut at 100 km2) for the three
principal network operators in a large-sized town (here the historical center of the city of Genoa).
LTE networks rcell σ
A
LTE [14] σ
B
LTE [14]
Italy TIM 1.45 2.33 0.230
Vodafone 1.45 2.33 0.230
Wind Tre 1.25 2.04 0.200
est. combined 0.79 1.28 0.130
Rome TIM 0.33 0.53 0.053
Vodafone 0.26 0.42 0.042
Wind Tre 0.22 0.35 0.036
est. combined 0.15 0.24 0.024
Genoa TIM 0.37 0.59 0.060
Vodafone 0.28 0.45 0.045
Wind Tre 0.66 1.10 0.105
est. combined 0.21 0.34 0.034
Table I: Estimated individual positioning accuracies in
scenario A and B for different LTE network providers in
different territories, using the methods discussed in the
text. All distances are given in km.
Reaching individual’s proximity accuracy
The spatial resolution analysis here performed shows
that anonymous number of connections data (scenario
A) could provide reliable information about population
density on the scale of hundreds of meters in most ur-
ban contexts, i.e. allowing only big crowds to be dis-
tinguished, unless further capillarization of the networks
are made available. Non-anonymous location data, on
the other hand, would provide spatial resolutions in the
order of the tens of meters (scenario B), i.e. the scale of
small crowds and the individual proximity.
The studies reported before [14] underlined that sig-
nificant improvements of the anonymous cell identity
GSM networks rGSM σ
A
GSM [14] σ
B
GSM [12]
Italy TIM 2.10 3.36 0.357
Vodafone 2.11 3.37 0.359
Wind Tre 1.74 2.78 0.296
est. combined 1.13 1.81 0.192
Rome TIM 0.94 1.51 0.163
Vodafone 0.36 0.58 0.061
Wind Tre 0.70 1.12 0.120
est. combined 0.30 0.48 0.051
Genoa TIM 0.34 0.54 0.058
Vodafone 0.32 0.51 0.054
Wind Tre – – –
est. combined 0.23 0.37 0.039
Table II: Estimated individual positioning accuracies in
scenario A and B for different GSM network providers
in different territories, using the methods discussed in
the text. All distances are given in km.
method can be obtained by deploying mini- and micro-
cells inside buildings, enhancing the CI resolution to 
100 m. A further study from the same group [8] showed
also that indoor resolutions up to σOTDOA = 1.8 m can
be reached by deploying indoor LTE pico-cells combined
with an enhanced, iterative OTDOA approach. Finally,
GPS-assisted UE locating (also known as A-GNSS), a
part of the LTE standard, is also a solid possibility for
resolution enhancement in outdoor contexts, reaching the
scale of ≈ m.
Another possibility for the CI approach to reach the
∼ 10 m resolutions would be to complement mobile loca-
tion data with higher resolution local data sources, such
as public WiFi hotspots, public means of transportation
locations, smart mobility devices locations, RF-noise lev-
9els monitoring tools. As these networks are much less ho-
mogeneous than mobile network between different urban
contexts, calibration of the reconstructed density maps
with mobile network devices would likely be necessary
anyway. To date, no known protocols are available for in-
dividual users to contribute with their own access points
to an hypothetical WiFi collective monitoring network.
Levels of resolution in the m range would allow social
distancing regulations to be enforceable at the individ-
ual scale, posing however the significant challenge of bal-
ancing the risks to individual privacy loss (see Privacy
section). Practical use cases in means of public trans-
portation, individual businesses, industries, offices and
marketplaces would become a solid possibility, requiring
only further capillarization of mobile network technolo-
gies - a trend that is already happening with the devel-
opment of 5G networks. A summary of the identified
methods per resolution provided is shown in Tab. III.
Available positional methods
≈ 100 m (interact. w. area) Cell Identity
≈ 10 m (interact. w. proximity) OTDOA, Triang.
≈ 1 m (interact. w. individuals) A-GNSS (outdoor),
OTDOA+ (indoor)
Table III: Summary of available mobile-network-based
positioning methods per spatial resolution scale.
PRIVACY
The possibilities offered by existing technologies in
mass locating people with spatial accuracies at the level
of single individuals proximity, discussed in the above
sections, raise privacy concerns that, if not properly han-
dled, would prevent the adoption of a mass RTLS as the
one here proposed.
On the one hand, as stated by Fisher and Dobson in
[17], “each individual should be able to negotiate access by
another person to information about their location. No
one else should be able to circumvent that right”. On the
other hand, as discussed by Ratti et al. in [18], there
is general consensus that aggregated population density
maps can be made to satisfy all requirements of data
anonymity, i.e. without violating any personal data pro-
tection regulation. Fisher and Dobson also point out in
[17] that as long as personal data is not made available
by mobile phone operators to third parties, most privacy
concerns are avoided.
Here we first review the juridical literature on personal
data privacy relevant for this matter, i.e. that defining
law boundaries to data anonymity. Then we take a quan-
titative approach to address the implementation of the
privacy constraints, laying down the specifications of the
second key part of the system: the user data anonymiza-
tion and mapping algorithm.
Juridical boundaries
The boundaries of data anonymity are sketched by
recital 26 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the process-
ing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation) (see [19]), stating that: “The
principles of data protection should therefore not apply to
anonymous information, namely information which does
not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person
or personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner
that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable”.
The boundaries of identifiability are also sketched in the
same recital 26: “To ascertain whether means are rea-
sonably likely to be used to identify the natural person,
account should be taken of all objective factors, such as
the costs of and the amount of time required for identifi-
cation, taking into consideration the available technology
at the time of the processing and technological develop-
ments”. This formulation implies that technical analysis
to evaluate the feasibility and the efforts required to iden-
tify the natural person to which data relate have to be
carried out during the design phase of any information
systems involving personal data, leaving open the data
anonymization modality.
Aggregated data that can be proven to fall under these
prescriptions can thus be declared anonymous; for these,
the recital clearly states: “(the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation) does not concern the processing of such
anonymous information, including for statistical or re-
search purposes”. Thus, if proper mitigation of the risk
that a single person’s identity can be retrieved is carried
out, real-time population density maps can be considered
anonymous data and thus publicly distributed.
Ensuring data anonymity
A standard adopted technique for anonymizing map-
ping data consists in introducing a minimal threshold on
the number of individuals per cell, under which the cell is
discarded from the map. This guarantees a high combi-
natorial cost for following single individuals on the map.
For instance, if an average of 4 individuals per map cell
is present, in order to reconstruct the trajectory of one
of them starting from a given cell in the map, the whole
combinatorial tree of possible steps into nearby valid cells
should be considered, whose number of branches grows
by 4n where n being the number of steps. This is the
principle beyond anonymizing by thresholding: making
de-facto impossible the reconstruction of a single trajec-
tory, and thus its de-anonimization, due to the very high
number of equally-likely possible combinations.
This method has a drawback: not all of the available
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information is used to generate the map, as that from
a certain fraction of the individuals is discarded after
thresholding. The amount of information lost is by con-
struction highly non-linear in the number of people per
cell, causing critical statistics losses when the size of the
mapping cells is small enough for the average number of
people per cell to be comparable or smaller than unity.
In other words, the choice of the thresholding level im-
poses a minimal resolution to the mapping system, under
which most of the information available is discarded.
In the present case, this drawback would significantly
limit the maximal resolution of the proposed system and
its risk-prevention capability, as its goal is by construc-
tion to get as close as possible to the single individual
scale.
Anonymizing positions preserving interdistances
To avoid this thresholding inconvenience, we developed
a position anonymizing system working independently
from the spatial resolution scale choosen for mapping.
It is based on preserving the key information necessary
for prevention, i.e. mutual interdistance between indi-
viduals, with the highest accuracy, while anonymizing
individuals’ absolute positions.
Here for sake of simplicity we describe the approach in
a mono-dimensional scenario; the bi- and tri-dimensional
cases follow as its straightforward generalizations.
1. Anonymizing: the first step (see Fig. 8.1) con-
sists in collecting from the localization system the
set of original positions x0
(n) (here supposed exact)
of each of the N individuals in the mapping do-
main (n ∈ [1, N ]). A set of random positions x1(n)
are then generated following Gaussian distributions
G[x1(n),σ(n)](x) centered on x0
(n) with standard de-
viations σ(n). These generated positions x1
(n) take
the name of anonymized position, whereas the co-
efficients σ(n) take the name of anonymization pa-
rameters.
2. Wave-packeting: the second step (see Fig. 8.2)
consists in constructing wave packets ψ(n)(x) rel-
ative to each anonymized position x1
(n). Each
ψ(n)(x) is a complex-valued function with complex-
amplitude given by the same Gaussian distri-
bution used for generating anonymized posi-
tions, G[x1(n),σ(n)](x), and complex-phase depen-
dent upon the distance between each point of the
grid x and the original individual position x0
(n),
exp(ik||x0(n) − x||), where k = piM/L is the spa-
tial sampling wavenumber, here chosen (following
Nyquist theorem) for a full wavelength to match
2 times the map resolution d = L/M (L be-
ing the whole map size). All wave packets are
summed up in a collective wave-function ψ(x) =∑N
n=1 ψ
(n)(x), which is then sampled over the M
points p(m) of the regular grid chosen for mapping
(here m ∈ [1,M ]) to build the aggregated complex-
valued map ψ(m) ≡ ψ(p(m)). ψ(m) takes the
name of unmatched wavefunction since its phase
reference is still arbitrary. It is no longer possi-
ble to reconstruct the original positions x0
(n) from
ψ(m) to better than σ(n), as each of the individ-
ual wave-functions are centered on the Gaussianly-
randomized positions x1
(n). Whether this aggre-
dated map can now be considered anonymous or
not, it depends only on the choice of σ(n) rather
than that of the mapping accuracy. If σ(n) coef-
ficients in the anonymization step are chosen so
that many individuals’ wave-packets overlap with
each other, combinatorial anonymization is again
provided (see next sections) while surpassing the
limitation of loosing information of anonymization
by thresholding. This process thus allows con-
structing aggregated, anonymized complex-valued
unmached wavefunctions from H localization sys-
tem providers, ψ
(m)
h (with h ∈ [1, H]), that can now
be individually distributed to a third-party.
3. Common-phase matching: the third step (see
Fig. 8.3) is run by the system collecting all in-
dividual unmatched wavefunctions ψ
(m)
h received
from the individual providers. A phase rotation
exp(iφh) is applied to each of the unmatched wave-
function, allowing each one to be referenced to the
same phase-referencing system and thus construct-
ing phase-matched wavefunctions that can be now
summed up constructively. Unmatched wavefunc-
tions are assumed here to be built on the same
previously-set mapping grid p(m). Phase rotation
coefficients allow, in other words, all individual
maps to be cross-calibrated on the same positional
referencing system.
4. Summing and mapping: the fourth an last step
(see Fig. 8.4) consists in summing all matched
wavefunctions together and then take the complex-
modulo operation to build the final population den-
sity map ρ(m) = |∑Hh=1 exp(iφh)ψ(m)h |. This ob-
tained density map can be shown to be equal to
the exact distribution of people (i.e. that built with
the original positions x0
(n)) in the limit of high N ,
whereas in the limit of low N , it is set mostly by
the anonymized positions x1
(n) (see next section).
It can be shown that the process here described alters
the positions of the single individuals while maintaining
the possibility to calculate their mutual interdistances,
encoded as complex-phase differences. The working prin-
ciple of this method is easily understood if one computes
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Figure 8: Anonymization and privacing example in a mono-dimensional domain. The columns refer to the four steps
of the anonimyzing and mapping algorithm described in the text. The three rows are obtained with different
number of individuals: N = 4 (top), N = 100 (middle) and N = 10000 respectively.
the collective wave-function ψ(x) for a simplified case in
which only two-individuals are present. Here ψ(x) takes
the form:
ψ = G1 e
ik(p(m)−x0(1)) + G2 eik(p
(m)−x0(2))
where, for notation simplicity, we set G1 ≡
G[x1(1),σ(1)](x) and G2 ≡ G[x1(2),σ(2)](x). Taking the com-
plex squared-modulo, one gets:
|ψ|2 = G12 +G22 + 2G1G2 cos(k(x0(1) − x0(2)))
The two Gaussian terms G(1)(x) and G(2)(x) are cen-
tered in x1
(1) and x1
(2), thus not allowing position de-
anonimizing from a single map, while their interference
contains the oscillatory term cos(k(x0
(1) − x0(2))) which
encodes in the oscillations the reciprocal distance be-
tween the individuals, referenced to the mapping grid
and calculated with their original positions. The maxi-
mum amount of information that can be thus retrieved
from the final map about the two individuals are the two
anonymized positions, their mutual inter-distance and
the expected area in which each of the individuals is with
a given probability.
This process thus protects individual privacy in the
limit of a few people present in the map, an example of
which is shown in Fig. 8, first row, in which 4 people are
positioned at regular 200 m distances in a 1 km context
being mapped with 10 m resolution (Fig. 8, top left). The
final population density distribution produced by the al-
gorithm shows four Gaussian functions centered on the
anonymized positions and delocalized with σ = 50 m.
When the number of individuals grows to 100 (Fig. 8,
second row) and 10000 (Fig. 8, third row), progressively
all interference terms sum in phase and ultimately domi-
nate over the stochastic Gaussian terms, giving rise again
to the original density distribution in the statistical limit
of many people (compare Fig. 8 bottom row, red to blue
distributions). In all these cases it is always impossible
from the final distribution to retrieve the exact original
positions, as the first stochastic anonymization cannot be
inverted.
It’s worth noticing that this inversion cannot be per-
formed exactly even considering many different realiza-
tions of the maps at different time instants, as the
stochastic anonymizing process give different anonymized
positions at each time. This task can be shown to be
equivalent to retrieving the exact position of a quantum
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particle at rest obeying Heisenberg’s uncertainty princi-
ple. Its exact position would be found only in the limit
of infinite observations, and only if the particle is at rest
all the time (i.e. with null average velocity). Combin-
ing many observations over a long time of a well isolated
single individual in quiet may still allow to reduce the
positional uncertainty statistically down to an undesired
high level of accuracy. Several approaches are being in-
vestigated to prevent this from happening by design. The
simplest one is the addition of a small amount of white
noise to each of the complex maps. A more sophisticated
approach is to introduce some combinatorial anonymiza-
tion, obtainable in this context (without any loss of infor-
mation) by selecting large enough σ(n) for several wave-
packets to overlap with each other in any point of the
map. Here the challenge is to select the values of σ(n)
following the local availability of statistics and adopting
an optimal resolution-to-anonymization criterion. This
approach is currently being investigated.
A POSSIBLE SYSTEM OVERVIEW
A sketch of the proposed data processing system is
shown in Fig. 9. The system is composed of two main
parts: a first data processing pipeline hosted in each data
provider computing facility and a second anonymous
data aggregation and post-processing pipeline hosted in
a common computing infrastructure providing also open
data publication.
The first part of the data processing falls inevitably un-
der the responsibility of each location data provider, as
they must comply with the strict policies about personal
data handling. This processing involves the collection of
users’ locations and their subsequent anonymization into
a single anonymous, aggregated complex-valued map, fol-
lowing the algorithm described in the previous sections.
Each of these maps, being now anonymous and compliant
with privacy regulations (also discussed in the previous
sections), can now be transmitted to the common com-
puting infrastructure that collects all of them from the
different location providers participating in the initiative.
The role of the common project infrastructure is to run
the common-phase matching and mapping algorithms
also discussed in the previous sections, to produce the
final population density maps which are made available
openly. The frequency of new maps generation has to
lie in the range of minutes, in order to be effective for
prevention on typical human time scales.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes the start of an initiative for de-
veloping a privacy-protecting real-time, open-data pop-
ulation density and flux mapping system, hypothetically
named PeopleTraffic, designed to support citizens and
public authorities in harmonizing epidemic diffusion risks
whilst properly dealing with privacy concerns. In the
specific, it is meant as a tool for aiding the management
of the COVID-19 pandemics Phase-2, which is expected
to last approximately until either population herd immu-
nity is obtained or a vaccination becomes available to the
mass public.
The proposed system is based upon recognizing that
social distancing regulations, enforcing physical separa-
tion between individuals to limit population density and
reducing individual-to-individual contacts, have been the
most effective tool in mitigating the spread of epidemics
driven by individual-to-individual contact (as COVID-19
and most influenza viruses).
The proposed system makes use of the nowadays cap-
illary distributions of mobile network stations (i.e. these
adopting GSM, UMTS, and LTE network technologies)
to construct real-time population density and flux maps
with sufficient spatial and temporal resolutions to get
close to the individual proximity scale. The construc-
tion of these maps includes an innovative approach to
privacy-by-design, compliant with the current European
privacy regulations which, thanks to a quantum-inspired
delocalization process, preserves the key information nec-
essary for prevention (i.e. mutual inter-distance between
individuals) with the highest accuracy while anonymizing
individuals’ absolute positions. The proposed method is
robust against incomplete cell phone possession or acti-
vation, intentional de-activation of cell phones by their
owners or prevalence of specific providers in specific ar-
eas.
In place of ex-post intervening when positive cases
of infection are detected (which typically happens with
some time-lag from the diffusion event), the here-
obtained real-time people distribution maps support pre-
ventively orienting people towards safe behaviour allow-
ing, e.g., choosing the timing and the means of trans-
portation for commuting. They would also provide valu-
able information to policy-makers in taking decisions
based on people density, which has proved so far one of
the most reliable a-priori predictors of infection spread-
ing.
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